

committees on even a preliminary scale during this session.

Most especially, I hope that we can now launch into a constructive and responsible public review of this venture. This is necessary. I fervently urge appropriate officials of our Government to bring this subject to the forefront of public discussion.

I would like to include at this point in the RECORD Mr. Alastair Buchan's article from the New Republic:

#### IS THIS NATO CRISIS NECESSARY?

(By Alastair Buchan)

For the first time in 40 years there are to be British and American elections within a few weeks of each other. And there is now a serious risk that both the pre- and the post-election period will feature a major allied row over the proposal for a multilateral force, which may seriously divide Britain, America, and Germany from one another and drive De Gaulle further into a corner. This risk has been created by the Johnson administration's decision to seek final agreement on the MLF by December of this year, to get the enabling treaty legislation through the various national parliaments by the summer of 1965, ostensibly so that the issue shall not become a political football in the German general elections of next summer. Given the degree of doubt and perplexity about the MLF proposal, particularly in Britain, but also in the Netherlands and Italy, there is a danger of NATO suffering a self-inflicted wound at the very moment when scars of earlier battles are beginning to heal.

The American proposal is to create a multilaterally owned fleet of 25 surface ships with 200 Polaris missiles. Eight countries (the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Greece, and Turkey) have been discussing it for many months. The proposal has a tangled history. Ever since the advent of the missile age began to create doubts about the credibility of the American commitment to Europe, and the advent of the British and French nuclear forces began to create tensions within Europe, two basic approaches to strengthening the cohesion of the alliance without weakening its strength or spreading the ownership of nuclear weapons have been conceivable.

One is to accept that NATO is an alliance of sovereign powers that cannot relinquish ultimate control of their own weapons; to commit the forces of the nuclear allies to NATO for planning purposes; and to reorganize the institutions of the alliance so as to give all the nonnuclear allies the maximum degree of influence over strategic and political planning, but leaving operational decisions in a nuclear crisis in the hands of the nuclear powers. This is the so-called multinational solution. The other is to associate the nonnuclear allies more intimately with the planning, finance, and operational control of part of the overall Western strategic forces, by creating an allied owned, mixed manned, jointly controlled nuclear force—the so-called multilateral solution.

The project for a multilateral force arose from the conjunction of military studies that had been made on the mixed manning of nuclear forces in Europe, and the political proposals to commit American missile-firing submarines to NATO. In the middle of 1962 a small number of enthusiasts in the State Department, allied to a still smaller number in the U.S. Navy, began work on a plan for a mixed manned seaborne force (originally of Polaris submarines) which would be manned, financed, and controlled jointly by the United States

and those European allies who were interested. Throughout the summer of 1962 their emissaries toured the European capitals to propound the merits of their idea.

Until early last year they made only limited progress in Washington, despite a public relations campaign to gain official, political, and academic support, of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe and the antislavery movement. President Kennedy, in particular, was unwilling to adopt their plan as a central objective of official American policy until he was quite certain that no other solution—some form of European-American strategic partnership or a reorganization of NATO itself—was viable.

But after Cuba the pressures began to multiply. The prospect of serious negotiations with Moscow, which later culminated in the test ban and the hot line, brightened. In December 1962 Adenauer agreed in principle to the Franco-German pact, which carried the alarming implication of some Franco-German deal on nuclear sharing. In the vacuum left by Britain's failure to gain entry to the Common Market and the collapse of the Kennedy grand design, the ideas of the multilateralists began to make some headway in the United States and considerable headway in Germany, Italy, Belgium, and even Britain.

The historian will have a tough time deciding whether there ever was a real demand for the MLF in Germany, or whether the offer of a major share in the MLF forced the German Government to play the role the State Department had already assigned it, namely a country eager for physical association with the control of nuclear weapons; whether, as the defense correspondent of the London Times phrased it, "the problem has in fact been created by passionate advocacy of the solution." Certainly it is ironic that by the time the MLF project was publicly launched, the German leaders whom Washington most distrusted in this connection, Chancellor Adenauer and Defense Minister Strauss, had disappeared from office. But by the fall of last year, not only the Erhard government but intelligent Social Democrats like Herr Fritz Erler, the vice chairman of the party, had become reluctantly convinced that the MLF was the best way to combat American nuclear isolationism.

Shortly after President Kennedy's death the multilateralists got from President Johnson a firm endorsement of the project as a central objective of American policy which they had never received from his predecessor. And with this the European political reaction has become gradually more explicit. In Paris it is no longer regarded as a joke, but as a threat to put France in the position of eventually having to join an organization of which it is not a founder member. In Germany, it is seen by most people as a means of emphasizing the priority of the Atlantic over the European connection (in which many Germans are beginning to lose interest), while giving Germany greater status in the councils of the alliance than she has hitherto possessed. In Belgium and in Holland it is seen in much the same terms, and also as a means of keeping Gaullism at bay. In Italy views are more muddled: The left-wing members of the Government fear its effect on relations with the Soviet bloc and on the domestic political scene, the right see in it the eventual nucleus of a European force. Only the two Scandinavian governments, Norway and Denmark, have held aloof from the discussions; they are not disposed to join the MLF even if it becomes a reality and they fear that it will increase the strength of neutralist sentiment in their own countries.

The MLF proponents argue that since France—and perhaps the U.S. Congress as

well—blocks the path to a more comprehensive reorganization of NATO, the MLF provides an alternative to a gradual fragmentation of the alliance. It would give the European countries which decide to participate some responsibility as well as knowledge about nuclear targeting, force levels and general policy. They would also be financially involved, which would have the dual merit of forcing them to take their responsibilities seriously and of taking a small share of the burden of Western deterrence off American shoulders.

One of the strongest arguments in favor of the MLF is that it could provide a focal point for the growth of a more organic system of alliance cooperation. The European Coal and Steel Community did not have a very important practical function when it was first founded in 1950, but became the seed of other European institutions. Many European supporters of the MLF see it as essentially an Atlantic, not a European, force, and they are alienated by such speculations as those of Mr. Walt Rostow, director of the policy planning staff, who in a speech to the Western European Union Assembly in Rome on June 24, thought aloud about the eventual withdrawal of the U.S. veto on the control of the force, and of the MLF as a dowry to a politically united Europe. Such statements, which are probably meaningless in terms of what Congress would accept and are certainly contrary to American policy about nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, are presumably intended to provide a bait for France.

The military and economic arguments for confining the principle of multilateral forces to a seaborne fleet of 25 ships and 200 Polaris missiles make little more sense today than when the project was first discussed. True, the problem of mixed manning is not a serious one; and the operational research that has been carried out on the problem of the vulnerability of the ships shows that this too is a manageable problem. The cost to the European participants (about \$260 million a year if the United States pays 40 percent of the bill) is supportable, even though it necessarily involves some diversion of resources from stronger armies in Europe, an equally cherished objective of American policy, and even though the cost in terms of skilled manpower is considerably higher for the small European navies and the strategic cost of justifying Soviet missile fleets in the Western Atlantic may be higher still. But the real question is whether a force of this kind, which is marginal to American or allied strategic requirements, will in fact provide a better European association with American nuclear planning and decisions. Where does it fit into the American policy of "controlled response"? What relevance would it have to real crisis bargaining in another nuclear confrontation like Cuba, and what influence therefore would it give the European allies?

#### TWO OTHER PROPOSALS

It is because of such doubts about the military relevance of such a seaborne force that two other proposals have been considered. One, which was advocated by the retiring Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Dirk Stikker, is for a direct European contribution to the cost, manning, and control of the Minuteman ICBM's, a force that is a central part of the Western deterrent. There is nothing inherently stranger about an international missile crew in the middle of Wyoming or North Dakota than there is about one in the middle of the North Atlantic. But so far Stikker's idea has received little serious attention, and it might well be that Congress would find this too much to digest.

The other proposal, which was officially put forward by Britain at the end of June, is to have the MLF combine a small seaborne

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element with another element built around the strike aircraft and missiles in Europe. Drawing on her wartime experience when the RAF bombers were successfully manned by mixed crews of Australians, Canadians, Czechs, Poles, and Frenchmen, Britain has proposed that part of the allied interdiction forces in Europe should be converted into a single force, jointly financed, owned, and controlled.

This idea has certain clear advantages. It concerns the weapons on which the immediate security of Europe depends, and is a much more suitable focus for joint European-American finance and control than the seaborne fleet. Moreover, it does not involve creating new forces, and should therefore prove less costly in terms of money and specialized manpower. It has not, however, had a warm reception in Washington, partly because the Johnson administration is so passionately committed to the seaborne force that it regards any alternative proposal as a diversionary tactic, partly because it has been so long delayed by interservice arguments in London that it threatened, if it is assimilated into the existing negotiations, to throw out the time schedule which Washington has now laid down.

The British position is a difficult and unhappy one. At the Nassau meeting of December 1962 both the British and American participants got their terminology and the issues seriously confused. The British Government thought it had full American backing in pursuing the multinational solution by committing all its nuclear weapons to the planning control of NATO, and realized only late in the day that it was the multilateral solution which was going to win out.

There is growing support in London for the MLF as a political idea because it offers Britain an opportunity, which is not open in the economic field to enter a close form of association with Germany and four or five other European countries, and thus to face post-De Gaulle France rather than post-Macmillan Britain with a choice between isolation from European support or participating in a development which she herself has not originated.

But Britain is expected to have only a 10-percent share in the seaborne force, which in the eyes of the German Government entitles her to be treated only as a minor European power on questions of planning and control. This she cannot accept if she is to participate at all. Therefore, if the MLF is to become a reality Britain must fight for parity with Germany. She has to persuade her allies to extend the plan to aircraft and missiles in Europe, of which she is a major contributor. Or else Britain must buy a larger share in the seaborne force, which would mean either scrapping her own Polaris program or drastically increasing her defense expenditure, something which the government to be elected in October, whether Tory or Labor, would find it politically very difficult to do, especially as a great deal of money has already been committed to the Polaris program for several years ahead.

The situation is complicated by the fact that Labor, which is likely to form the next government, has been consistently hostile to the MLF, preferring to try to negotiate in Washington some new form of political machinery within the alliance in return for abandoning the British Polaris program. The fact that neither Bonn, Paris, nor Washington is very likely to be interested in any such proposal will not make it any easier for Labor to switch its position if it is asked to take an irrevocable decision about the MLF within a few weeks of taking office, as would be demanded by the present American timetable.

In my view, we can only avoid a serious crisis within the alliance, and one which will have direct repercussions on East-West relations, if all concerned use their heads on

three subjects in particular. The first is the question of timing. To use the German elections as a deadline is essentially phony, since the MLF is not an election issue in Germany. It is being used as an excuse by those who want to crowd on sail for fear that their project may lose momentum.

#### EASTERN EUROPE'S FEARS

The second concerns the operational control of the force. Until the question of whether it is to be an Atlantic force or eventually a European force is settled in equivocal language, it is impossible to tell who the true supporters of the proposal are, for if there is any serious idea that the Europeans would one day buy out the American share, then Britain, Germany and Holland lose their interest, while, if it is to remain a permanent Atlantic force, the Italians may lose theirs. To talk, as some of the American protagonists do, of leaving room for either solution, is as unrealistic as it would have been to expect the Founding Fathers to have written the principles of secession into the American Constitution. Nor do German ideas on weighted voting have any realism when it comes to such grim issues as peace and war.

Finally, there is the question of MLF's effect on the new Western relation with the Communist bloc. There is a serious danger that misunderstandings about the force, and the German role in it, may create such misgivings in Eastern Europe as to permit the Soviet Union to reestablish much tighter control over countries that are on the edge of ceasing to be satellites. There is need for a less hasty study of the problem. This might convince all concerned, British, German, and Americans, that, in terms of diplomacy, of which strategy and missiles are merely servants, a considerably firmer commitment of present British and of larger American nuclear forces to the full planning control of NATO, and the evolution of better machinery for peacetime planning and crisis management for all the allies, may prove better in the future than the MLF itself.

#### THE WILLIAM WIELAND CASE

**THE SPEAKER** pro tempore (Mr. LIBONATI). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. BROMWELL] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. BROMWELL. Mr. Speaker, I asked for this time on the spur of the moment because of a startling article which appeared in the Des Moines Register on yesterday, August 3, 1964, which has just come to my attention.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to include that article at this point in the RECORD.

**THE SPEAKER** pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The article is as follows:

[From the Des Moines Register, Aug. 3, 1964]

#### RUSK'S TOUCHY CHORE: DECIDING FATE OF CONTROVERSIAL UNDERLING

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Secretary of State Dean Rusk is faced with the touchy political chore of deciding whether to oust William Wieland as a security risk or restore him to full status as a Foreign Service officer.

The State Department said Saturday a special three-man panel made a decision in the last few weeks. Its press office declined, however, to state whether the panel ruled for or against the Latin American expert.

Richard Phillips, department press officer, said Rusk must make the final decision.

The Wieland case has been one of the most controversial in recent years. It is among those that caused the fight between State Department security evaluator Otto Otepka

and his superiors. Otepka contended there was laxity in handling the Wieland case and others.

The original Wieland security case was up for decision in 1961 when the Kennedy administration took office. Otepka had made a decision there was not sufficient evidence to label Wieland disloyal or a Communist, but he had found that Wieland had given incorrect information to Government officials on several matters.

Otepka ruled Wieland should be forced to resign because of this questionable integrity.

Despite this finding by Otepka, Wieland was cleared by Secretary of State Rusk's office. Wieland was about to be assigned to a highly sensitive post in Germany when FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover went to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to express concern.

#### PAPER SHUFFLING

It was on Kennedy's orders that Wieland then was blocked from the assignment to Germany and given an administrative job in the State Department where, it was reported, he was not permitted to handle security cases.

The State Department press office stated at that time that Wieland was in a "paper shuffling" job, and that he was to be retained in that type of post.

Wieland had held posts in the U.S. embassies in a number of Latin American countries, including Cuba, and in the late fifties was Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs at the State Department.

During that time, the FBI and other agencies submitted voluminous reports on Fidel Castro's Communist connections, some of them indicating he was a Communist. However, most of this information was stopped at Wieland's desk and did not go to higher officials.

Not having this information, President Dwight Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and later Secretary of State Christian Herter were of the opinion Castro was not a Communist—at least until a man at a White House party made some remarks to Mr. Eisenhower about Castro's Communist background. President Eisenhower was disturbed, and asked the Secretary of State to contact FBI Director Hoover.

Hoover then informed the President and Secretary of State that he had submitted much information to them that had been stopped at a lower level.

#### OTEPKA TESTIFIED

Otepka testified about the details of the Wieland case and the decision by superiors to overrule his finding that Wieland was unsuitable for employment in the State Department.

Since that time, new information has been developed in the State Department Security Division indicating Wieland was in error in contending he had met Castro only on two occasions. Investigators developed evidence indicating he had been with Castro on at least a half dozen occasions.

On the basis of these meetings and the fact they did not regard his initial answers as frank or correct, other security officials last March recommended that Wieland be fired.

This time the recommendation was that Wieland was "unsuitable" and was also a security risk because of his lack of frankness on his contacts with Castro.

This recommendation was made last March—more than 6 months after Otepka had been removed from control of the security evaluation division as a result of charges of "insubordination" brought by superiors.

The Wieland case was one of a number of cases involved in the dispute between Otepka and his superiors, who contended Otepka should not have given certain security information to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

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It is reported by usually reliable sources that this three-member panel has concluded Wieland should not be fired, but should be reinstated as a Foreign Service officer. It is now up to Secretary Rusk to rule.

President Johnson is reported concerned because of possible repercussions in the political campaign this fall. Democrats as well as Republicans on the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee have expressed disagreement with the initial decision to retain Wieland, even in a "paper shuffling" capacity.

**Mr. BROMWELL.** Mr. Speaker, Members who have been interested in the abuse which Otto Otepka and certain of his subordinates have received from the Department of State, and for that matter, the Civil Service Commission, will be interested to learn, incredible though it may seem to them, that there is a strong possibility that Mr. William Wieland may be restored to full status as a Foreign Service officer.

This is the second opportunity that the Secretary of State has had to pull Wieland's chestnuts out of the fire. If we are diligent we should watch closely to see what he does now. It has been reliably reported that a three-man panel has concluded that Wieland should not be fired from the State Department but should be reinstated.

In the first instance Wieland was marked for discharge by the security division. Thereafter, the office of the Secretary cleared him and prepared to assign him to a highly sensitive post in Germany. On that occasion it was J. Edgar Hoover and the Attorney General who prevented this assignment. Now here the question is again.

There seems to be no question but that it was William Wieland who failed or refused to forward data to higher officials which would have marked Fidel Castro as a Communist and, needless to say, this information was vital to the well-being of the American people. Later he was marked for removal from the State Department and this plan was thwarted as I have said.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to include at this point in the Record an article from the Des Moines Register of July 29.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The article referred to is as follows:

WITNESSES IN OTEPKA CASE INSTRUCTED ON  
WHAT TO SAY

(By Clark Mollenhoff)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The State Department has barred its officials from discussing the Otto Otepka case before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

It was learned Tuesday that the Department legal office is instructing prospective witnesses before the Senate subcommittee that they should not give testimony relative to department efforts to oust Chief Security Evaluator Otepka.

After instructing the witnesses, one or two legal officers from the Department accompany the witnesses to the hearings to monitor the testimony given.

UNFORTUNATE SITUATION

Roger Robb, attorney for Otepka, said Tuesday that "it is unfortunate that the State Department is adopting procedures under which the Senate subcommittee will be unable to get all the facts on the Otepka case."

The State Department has brought charges of insubordination against Otepka for delivering three documents to the Senate subcommittee last year to prove that he was telling the truth about laxity in handling security matters in the department.

Otepka has argued that he had the obligation to produce the documents to prove he was telling the truth, and to prove that his superiors were giving untruthful testimony under oath.

The subcommittee has backed Otepka in his claim.

The Department has not set a time for a hearing on its charges against Otepka, but one is expected in the next 2 or 3 weeks.

OTEPKA INTENT

Otepka has served notice that he expects to call a number of present and former Department employees in an attempt to prove that he is being punished because he opposed relaxation of security standards after Secretary of State Dean Rusk took office.

Otepka and his attorney, Robb, have tried to have a hearing examiner appointed from outside the Department. This request has been denied, and Otepka's case will be tried by officers under Rusk's jurisdiction.

"The State Department is hardly the forum in which one could expect the fullest frank testimony from all witnesses, when the State Department's highest officials are seeking to fire Mr. Otepka, and their subordinates are trying the case," Robb said.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee hearings were resumed last Wednesday, after Chairman JAMES EASTLAND, Democrat, of Mississippi, rejected as "unsatisfactory" a Rusk offer to settle the matter.

Rusk told them he would drop the effort to fire Otepka if Otepka would submit a letter asking for a transfer out of the security division. EASTLAND said this would amount to removal of Otepka from the security division because he had cooperated with the Senate subcommittee.

RESUME HEARINGS

When they refused his offer, Rusk said he would proceed with efforts to oust Otepka.

There have been five hearings since then. Witnesses who were favorable to Otepka were ordered to go to the State Department legal division where they were instructed by Richard Frank and Lawrence H. Hoover on their testimony before the Senate subcommittee.

They were told to tell the truth on basic security problems but to decline to give any information dealing with the Otepka case.

**Mr. BROMWELL.** Mr. Speaker, and yet here is a man who was found unsuitable as an employee who keeps finding his way into positions where he could do the entire cause of the free world harm. So difficult has the factfinding process become that at the moment it is hard to see how the State Department in the end could possibly be fair to all concerned. Its fierce and brutal injustice to Mr. Otepka and his subordinates has become well known. And here is William Wieland who also has been on ice for some time.

What, pray tell, could the secrets be? What sort of evaluation could have been made which would have caused Mr. Otepka and his evaluators to find Wieland a security risk, and then caused the same people to be overruled by the Panel whose recommendation now lies before the Secretary?

Is it not true that five ambassadors have been highly critical of Wieland for his attitudes toward Castro? Is it not true that J. Edgar Hoover intervened to prevent his assignment to a sensitive post after Otepka and his people had

found the facts? Is it not true that the Attorney General himself prevented this assignment? Is it not true that Wieland had seen Castro on at least six occasions when he said he had seen him only twice? And is it not true that the State Department through some kind of motivation not made clear, has refused to undertake proving its charges of insubordination against Otto Otepka? And is it not true that the main fault to be found with Otepka appears to be his having found Wieland not suitable as an employee.

The Secretary who represents the principles of the Republic outside the United States should presently represent them to the people, our own citizens.

**Mr. NELSEN.** Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

**Mr. BROMWELL.** I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

(Mr. NELSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

**Mr. NELSEN.** Mr. Speaker, much has been said in the past months concerning the Otepka case in the State Department, and I think it might be helpful to review some of the history of this case and particularly as to how Mr. Otepka became involved in the William Wieland investigation. From reports that have been brought to my attention, this is how the case has developed up until recently:

First. William Wieland was in charge of the Caribbean-Mexican desk at the State Department at the time of the rise of Castro. He was personally responsible for decisions that cut off supplies to Batista at a key point.

Second. There was evidence that Wieland knew of Castro's pro-Communist background but he did not include this in reports submitted to higher authorities.

Third. There was testimony that Wieland was strongly pro-Castro and five ambassadors were highly critical of his Castro leanings.

Fourth. A security investigation was conducted on Wieland's case, and Mr. Otepka made his findings that there was not sufficient evidence to rule Wieland a security risk. However, he did find that Wieland made false statements to security investigators and others. Otepka made an adverse recommendation on Wieland's case on grounds of "suitability" because Wieland "lied and misrepresented" on material matters. Despite this, Secretary of State Dean Rusk's department cleared Wieland.

Fifth. The FBI was concerned about the Wieland case, and there are printed newspaper reports that Attorney General Robert Kennedy also became concerned because of indications that Wieland would be sent to highly sensitive posts, either in Zurich, Switzerland, or Bremen, Germany.

Sixth. As a result of FBI and Justice Department concern, Wieland was put in a "paper shuffling" job at the State Department.

Seventh. In the last 2 years new evidence has been produced in the State Department's Security Division relative to Wieland's contacts with Castro. This evidence cast doubt on earlier statements

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by Wieland which limited his contact with Castro to "one or two" times.

Eighth. As a result of the new evidence, the security division evaluators at State earlier this year are said to have made a finding against Wieland on grounds of security as well as suitability. This report apparently was more adverse to Wieland than the one by Otepka several years earlier.

Ninth. Within a few weeks after making this report, two of the security evaluators who were responsible for it were transferred from the security division of the State Department against their wishes.

Tenth. In the last few days there have been newspaper reports that there is a move on in the State Department to overrule the security division evaluators and to give Wieland full clearance. One report states that a special board has already cleared Wieland.

In the light of the testimony of Otepka and the new evidence developed since then, the clearance of Wieland would appear to be highly questionable at best. It is always possible that Otepka was wrong when he stated that Wieland lied and misrepresented to the security investigators. However, Otepka is reported to be corroborated by other statements. Also, there appears to be no challenge to the accuracy of Mr. Otepka's statement. It is always possible that evaluators in the more recent investigation were not sound in finding that new evidence established that Wieland misrepresented his contacts with Castro when testifying before a committee of Congress.

However, it would not appear there is any evidence that Otepka is wrong. Unless Otepka is proven wrong, then Wieland is a man who lied and misrepresented facts in a security investigation. If this is true, then on this basis alone he should certainly not be an employee of the State Department. He should not be handling highly sensitive foreign affairs matters. There is no place in our State Department for men who give false information or misrepresent the facts either to security investigators or to the committees of Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank the gentleman from Idaho for yielding.

Mr. BROMWELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

#### THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION SHOOTS FROM HIP IN ATTACK- ING REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

(MR. KYL (at the request of Mr. SCHADEBERG) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, the Johnson administration has once again shot from the hip in attacking the Republican platform.

A plank adopted in San Francisco has especially aroused the ire of the Johnson administration. The plank declared that:

Under housing and urban renewal programs, notably in the Nation's Capital, it [Johnson administration] has created new

slums by forcing the poor from their homes to make room for luxury apartments, while neglecting the vital need for adequate relocation assistance.

As usual, the Democrats deny everything. This time they have issued a rebuttal which has been distributed to Democratic Senators and key people in the Johnson administration. According to the newspapers, the rebuttal was "turned out quickly" by the research staff of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, headed by Ronald F. Stinnett. Stinnett, a political scientist formerly on the faculty of the University of Minnesota, says he worked closely "with the people downtown" in preparing the rebuttal. At any rate, what we have here is another indication that primary motivations in the current program are political, not social or economic.

One cannot help but wonder just who Professor Stinnett worked closely with in preparing this rebuttal, especially the section dealing with urban renewal and housing. Could it be that he worked with William L. Slayton, the Federal Urban Renewal Commissioner, who is using this novel means to reply to the critics of his multibillion-dollar program?

It may be that some of you will recall the Huntley-Brinkley NBC network news program of November 6, 1963, devoted to Cleveland's urban renewal program, of which Mr. Slayton was the chief architect. It was he, as a top official of Webb & Knapp, who developed the Erieview project. The NBC documentary contained the following commentary:

Meanwhile, the city's true slums have suffered because of emphasis on downtown renewal. In this one, 4 out of 5 houses are officially classified, not just unsound, but dilapidated. Yet former Mayor Anthony Celebrezze said renewal of this area would have to wait until Erieview was started. Mr. Celebrezze is now U.S. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Under Mr. Slayton, in his present post as the Federal Commissioner of Urban Renewal, after this Cleveland experience, the program was bound to suffer, and it has. In city after city the slums, the rats, the housing deficiencies, and the enforcement of the "workable program" established by the Housing Act of 1954 to prevent the spread and recurrence of slums, have had to wait because of the higher priorities given profitable downtown commercial development by the Democrats.

When urban renewal has gone into slum areas, it has been the poor who have suffered most. One must look beyond the self-serving publications issued by Commissioner Slayton to find the real situation, for the truth is not in them. However, Mr. Slayton spoke at the annual dinner meeting of the Inter-Church Committee on Urban Renewal, according to the newspapers of May 20, 1964, and acknowledged as a "fact of life" that many Negro families are excluded from renewal areas because they are poor.

The newspapers reported that 200 top city design specialists attending a conference at Harvard University early in May 1964 declared that the low-income

housing efforts of the Federal urban renewal program have been a complete failure to date.

In an article in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1964, William G. Grigsby, associate professor of city planning at the University of Pennsylvania, stated that over 25 percent of the communities receiving aid under the Housing Act of 1949 and the urban renewal program established by it, do not have a single residential reuse project. Another 25 percent of the municipalities receiving assistance have reserved over 50 percent of their renewal acreage for nonresidential purposes. Of the projects begun, roughly 600 were primarily residential prior to renewal, but Professor Grigsby estimates that only 350 will fall under that classification upon completion. Usually, he observed, where room is made for residential renewal, it takes the form of housing for higher income families, which is often incompatible with the residential needs of most families in the city.

The central point of Professor Grigsby's article is that local renewal projects often subordinate national housing goals, expressed by Congress in the Housing Act of 1949, to local community objectives. Our distinguished colleague, the ranking minority member of the House Special Housing Subcommittee, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. WINNALL] has stated that "they have been encouraged to do so by Federal renewal officials."

Professor Grigsby writes, on the basis of his long and exhaustive study, that:

Meanwhile, the housing problem of the disadvantaged has gradually ceased to be of major concern to those responsible for public policy. Faced with declining rates and rising costs for municipal services, cities have used Federal renewal funds for projects that would shore up local finances. Thus, over 25 percent of the communities receiving aid under the act do not have a single reuse project. Instead, they have demolished slums and blighted areas to create sites for commerce and industry. Another 25 percent of the municipalities receiving assistance have reserved over 50 percent of their renewed acreage for nonresidential purposes. For all communities combined, approximately 600 projects were primarily residential prior to renewal, while only 350 will fall into this classification upon completion. Moreover, in most of the instances where local governments have made room in their plans for residential reuse, the new structures have taken the form of housing for higher income families.

Perhaps Professor Stinnett should meet Professor Grigsby, and I would be glad to help in arranging such a meeting so that the Johnson administration can get a clear picture of what actually has been taking place under their administration's housing and urban renewal officials.

You may recall that the Washington, D.C., Post and Star reported that Mrs. Robert H. (Jane) Jacobs, Jr., famous author of "The Death and Life of Great American Cities," and one of the country's best informed critics of the present urban renewal programs, was guest speaker at Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson's